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The purpose of this study was to examine mock jurors’ decision making in 
insanity cases.  Specific instructions (vs. typical) juror instructions were tested to increase 
jurors’ comprehension of verdict options and reduce the effects of preexisting attitudes 
and reliance on cognitively biased thought processes in their legal decision making.  
The specific instructions in this study were inspired by Fuzzy Trace Theory, which holds 
that simple language and visual aids that convey the ‘gist’ of complex information can 
help people make better decisions (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Participants (N= 496) were 
randomly assigned to one of two juror instruction conditions (specific vs. typical). All 
participants read a 10-page insanity defense case vignette, and were tasked with reaching 
a verdict.  They were provided with 5 verdict options: Not Guilty, Guilty, and three 
different insanity options (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Guilty but Mentally Ill, 
Guilty Except Insane). Results supported the hypothesis that jurors who received specific 
(vs. typical) instructions would comprehend more information about the available 
verdicts, and would be more likely to choose an insanity defense verdict. As expected, 
jurors’ preexisting attitudes toward the insanity defense influenced their verdicts.  
Although it was hypothesized that increasing jurors’ understanding would result in them 
relying less on their attitudes and motivated reasoning processes in reaching their legal 
judgments, the evidence did not support this. Results suggest more specific instructions 
that includes information about outcomes is preferred by jurors, and that they are better 
able to understand and perform their duties when provided with more useful information.  
However, further research is needed to identify methods for helping jurors rely less on 
biased reasoning processes in their legal judgments. 
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The insanity defense is considered one of the most controversial legal defenses in 
the U.S criminal law (Daftary-Kapur, Groscup, O’Connor, Coffaro, & Galietta, 2001). 
The criminal court system and the mentally ill have a long and complicated history of 
intersections, and this history has affected public perceptions. The insanity defense is 
plagued with myths and misconceptions (Bloechl, Vitacco, Erickson, & Newmann, 
2007).  These misconceptions can have a biasing effect on the verdict decisions that 
jurors make in insanity defense cases.  
A fundamental presumption of the criminal justice system is that legal 
responsibility both entails actus reas (the criminal act) and mens rea (guilty mind) 
(Lymburner & Roesch, 1999; Huss, 2013). The insanity defense was created for 
situations in which the presence of a mental disorder renders a defendant unable to form 
criminal intent. Individuals would be considered not guilty by reason of insanity, if they 
engage in a criminal act, but are not judged to be criminally responsible due to lack of 
mens rea (Peters & Lecci, 2012). The underlying rationale of the insanity defense is that 
those who are mentally ill and cannot fully comprehend their actions should not be held 
responsible for their actions in the justice realm (Kachulis, 2017). Insanity is a legal 
defense often resulting in an acquittal based on the defendant’s inability to appreciate or 
control his/her actions because of mental illness or defect. The defendant must admit 
committing the crime in question to be able to plead the insanity defense (Daftary-Kapur 
et al., 2001).  
Insanity defenses can cause confusion, with people questioning how someone can 
be called “not guilty” even though it is clear that the defendant committed the crime. The 
task for jurors is complicated, having to decide in insanity cases whether the defendant 
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was mentally ill, or not, at the time of the crime- and beyond that whether the mental 
illness then precluded their ability to know right from wrong or to control their behavior. 
Jurors can be left with a sense of uneasiness which is then reinforced by the uncertainty 
of what actually happens after the verdict. Guilty is a verdict that many understand: the 
defendant goes to prison to serve their sentence, but few know what happens to a 
defendant that is acquitted by an insanity defense.  
Insanity cases present complex criteria for the defendant to meet, much of which 
jurors do not fully understand (Liu, 1993; Piel, 2012). The task of the jurors is to reach a 
legally appropriate verdict by applying the legal criteria and instruction given to them by 
the judge to the evidence that is presented during the trial (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 
2004). The job of the jury is to be a ‘fact-finder’, and they are assumed to come to a 
verdict based only on the evidence and testimony. The legal system assumes jurors can 
be blank slates and perform their tasks in a rational fashion, but research suggests 
otherwise.  The U.S. Constitution guarantees all criminal defendants the right of a trial 
with an impartial jury through the Sixth Amendment (which is then extended to certain 
civil cases in the Seventh Amendment), and a fair jury trial is contingent upon the 
selection of jurors who can apply the law with undue bias (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 
2004). A proposed solution is to add specific juror instructions to educate and help jurors 
make appropriate decisions in insanity defense cases.  
Attitudes, Bias, and the Jury  
An attitude is “a person’s disposition to respond favorably or unfavorably to 
stimuli” (person, object, event, etc.) (Ajzen, 1989, p. 241). Attitudes can have a strong 
influence on jurors’ decision-making. The stereotypes individuals have pertaining to 
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criminal offenses and offenders have a substantial influence on verdict decisions, even 
when jurors are instructed to set aside any biases they have (Skeem et al., 2004). 
Attitudes about the insanity defense have a profound influence on mock jurors’ verdicts, 
even overpowering juror instructions (Louden & Skeem, 2007). Rather than relying on 
any sort of legal instruction given to them, jurors may be relying on their own implicit 
model of insanity (Lymburner & Roesch, 1999). These biases against the insanity defense 
make it difficult for mentally ill defendants to receive a fair trial.  
Motivation, emotion, and intuition also influence judgements, and play a big 
factor in how people take in information and make decisions (Kunda, 1990). Based off 
their beliefs and attitudes, people are motivated to arrive at specific conclusions. This 
general phenomenon is called motivated reasoning, or motivated cognition. The theory 
holds that when decision makers have a preference regarding an outcome, they are more 
likely to arrive at their desired conclusion by engaging in inadvertently biased cognitive 
processes that are involved in accessing, constructing, and evaluating beliefs (Kunda, 
1990; Sood, 2013).  
People’s desires, hopes, and fears can lead them to perceive a representation of 
information that they desire. For example, when faced with an ambiguous figure, people 
interpret the figure in a way that would be more desirable to them when they are 
motivated to do so (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006), or in the legal context interpret the 
evidence to fit a specific story that they have created (based off the Story Model, 
Pennington & Hastie, 1986). The Story Model holds that jurors form a narrative of the 
evidence to attempt to organize the information intro a coherent mental representation. 
According to the model, jurors gather information and organize it into a comprehensive 
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narrative with a causal structure. While constructing their story, jurors use the evidence 
presented at trial and complete the story with their personal knowledge and expectations. 
Jurors map their accepted story onto the verdicts given to them, and chose the one that 
best matches their story (Levett, 2008).  
Misconceptions of the Insanity Defense 
Attitudes about the insanity defense often stem from common misconceptions. 
Perlin (1995) identified eight common myths that influence people’s perceptions of the 
insanity defense. These myths include perceptions that the insanity defense is frequently 
used by defendants and defense lawyers as a ploy to get acquitted. It is assumed they will 
receive a lighter sentence and in all reality the defendant is actually faking mentally 
illness (Daftery-Kapur et al., 2011; Perlin, 1995). Additionally, the insanity defense is 
thought to be limited only to murder and other violent crimes, meaning that those that 
plead insanity are thought to be the most dangerous of criminals, when in all reality that 
is not the case. Silver and colleagues (1994) examined those pleading insanity and found 
that only 14% of defendants were charged with murder.  
Another myth related to the insanity defense is there is no risk to the defendant to 
plead insanity. In order to plead an insanity defense, the defendant must admit to 
committing the crime in question. This is risky for defendants, especially when there is 
weak evidence linking the defendant to the crime. Additionally, just by raising the 
defense the defendant is more likely to receive a guilty verdict. A study conducted by 
Braff, Arvanites, and Steadman (1983) found those that unsuccessfully plead insanity 
were incarcerated 22% longer than those that did not raise the insanity defense. 
Furthermore, those that committed a nonviolent crime were committed up to nine times 
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longer than those that did not try to plead insanity (Steadman, Mulvey, & Monahan, 
1998).  
There is a perception that people found insane are quickly released. In reality, 
people that go to a psychiatric mental hospital are typically there indefinitely- until they 
are considered to be no longer mentally ill. Research on length of confinement of those 
acquitted from the insanity defense (Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity) found only 1% of 
the cases where individual was unconditionally released (Sliver et al., 1994). Normally, 
defendants acquitted by the insanity defense are committed and remain in the psychiatric 
hospital for treatment until they are able to convince the proper authorities that they are 
no longer a danger to themselves or society (Wheatman & Shaffer, 2001). In general, the 
public believes that the insanity defense is a loophole in the justice system for criminals 
to avoid prosecution and punishment for the crimes that they have committed.  
These types of societal misconceptions about the insanity defense lead to beliefs 
that individuals who are acquitted by the insanity defense are ‘getting off easy.’ Media 
has played a large role in solidifying these types of misconceptions. Acquittals like John 
W. Hinckley Jr.’s have stimulated strong opposition and public mistrust toward the 
defense (Bloechl et al., 2007).  
In 1982, John W. Hinckley Jr. tried to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and 
was acquitted by the insanity defense- specifically under Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity (NGRI). John Hinckley believed that by assassinating the president, he could 
win the affection of actress Jodie Foster. The public outcry after cases like this one have 
caused the legislature to react, for example by creating the Insanity Defense Reform Act 
of 1984.  This Act changed the burden of proof from the prosecution proving the 
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defendant was not insane to the defense having to prove the defendant was indeed insane 
at the time of the crime (Huss, 2013).  Some states even went as far as completely 
abolishing the defense, with many calling the defense a ‘legal monstrosity’ (Bloechl et 
al., 2007; Koshland, 1992).  
Standards for the Insanity Defense  
Not only is there a misunderstanding about what the insanity defense is and how it 
works, there is also confusion about the differences between the various insanity 
standards used across jurisdictions (e.g., M’Naughten Standard, Product Test, Brawner 
Test) and the different insanity verdict options (e.g., Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, 
Guilty But Mentally Ill, and Guilty Except Insane).  
An insanity defense standard sets the legal requirements the defendant needs to 
meet to be considered legally insane. In the courtroom, rather than simply being 
classified as being mentally ill, the defendant must be deemed “legally insane,” – a legal, 
not a clinical definition (Huss, 2013). Throughout history, the insanity defense standard 
changed, and there are multiple standards that are used at the state and federal level (e.g., 
M’Naughten, Product Test, Brawner Test).  For the purposes of this paper, the 
M’Naugthen standard (a common standard used in many states) will be addressed – 
because we use it in our current study.  
M’Naughten established the standard for insanity defense cases in 1843 after 
Daniel M’Naughten tried to assassinate British Prime Minister Sir Edward Peel. Rather 
than killing the Prime Minister, M’Naughten accidentally shot the Prime Minister’s 
secretary, Edward Drummond. Daniel M’Nagthen was adjudicated as Not Guilty by 
Reason of Insanity (NGRI) under the standard in place at the time of his trial, which was 
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the Wild Beast standard. Under the Wild Beast standard, “the defendant must be totally 
deprived of his understanding, that he does not know what he is doing; no more than an 
infant, a brute, or a wild beast” (Huss, 2013). This Wild Beast insanity defense standard 
was only a one-prong cognitive test, where the defendant must prove that he did not 
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing.  
The public was outraged that M’Naughten was found NGRI, as was Queen 
Victoria.  This outrage led Britain to develop a new insanity standard, which emerged as 
the M’Naughten standard (Huss, 2013).  Ironically, M’Naughten himself thus was not 
tried under the standard that bears his name. The M’Naughten test adds on to the Wild 
Beast test by adding an additional cognitive prong, that the defendant must not know the 
nature and quality of the act he was doing and that the defendant did not know what he 
was doing was wrong. This insanity standard was quickly adopted in the U.S. and is still 
the standard used by many of the states (Huss, 2013). 
Verdict Confusion 
An insanity defense verdict, in contrast to the standard, is the particular form of 
the insanity defense that a jurisdiction uses.  Traditionally, Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity verdict is used (Huss, 2013).  However, a common theme throughout the history 
of the insanity defense is public outrage about high-profile cases in which people are 
adjudicated insane.  Therefore, alternative insanity defense verdicts were developed by 
different legislatures that include more retributive elements than the NGRI verdict, 
including Guilty But Mentally Ill and Guilty Except Insane (Huss, 2013).  
The traditional insanity verdict option is Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity 
(NGRI), where the defendant is not convicted of the crime. Furthermore, they are 
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hospitalized and receive treatment rather than incarceration (Huss, 2013). They are 
considered to not be responsible for their crimes and are treated for their mental illness 
rather than punished. This verdict option was the insanity verdict norm for many years – 
until the John W. Hinckley Jr.’s trial. 
NGRI fell strongly out of public favor following the acquittal of John W. 
Hinckley Jr in 1982. In response to the public outrage, a new Guilty But Mentally Ill 
(GBMI) verdict option was developed in a few jurisdictions as a compromise verdict 
between NGRI and guilty – with more retributive components than NGRI but still with a 
nod toward rehabilitation by providing an option other than “guilty” (Finkel, 1991). 
GBMI was created to reduce the number of insanity acquittals and to assure treatment for 
such individuals within the correctional setting. Rather than being acquitted by the 
insanity defense, GBMI is a verdict that convicts the defendant as “guilty” and criminally 
culpable.  Furthermore, the convict is subject to criminal sanctions that are imposed on a 
person found guilty (Sloat & Frierson, 2005).  The idea is that they will receive treatment 
in prison, but this is not guaranteed, and in fact does not always happen. Some have 
argued against GBMI, calling the verdict ‘guilty but remorseful’ since the verdict does 
not indicate diminished capacity (Sloat & Frierson, 2005). 
Other states created their own unique verdict options.  For example, in 1994 
Arizona created a unique insanity defense verdict called Guilty Except Insane (GEI). GEI 
is another “compromise” verdict that includes more retributive elements than traditional 
NGRI, but that includes rehabilitative elements too (and in fact more rehabilitative 
elements than GBMI) (Smith, 2008).  Specifically, a person found GEI, in Arizona, is 
convicted of the crime and held criminally culpable.  They are sentenced, as they would 
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be had they been found guilty.  However, once a person is found GEI in Arizona, they are 
committed to a secure state mental health facility for treatment rather than sent to prison. 
Once released from the mental hospital, they finish out the rest of their sentence 
incarcerated in prison (similar to GBMI). This definition of GEI is specific to Arizona; 
GEI is found is other states with different outcomes. Having elements from both GBMI 
and NGRI, GEI in Arizona is essentially a compromise between GBMI and NGRI 
(Smith, 2008).   
There are also jurisdictions that provide jurors with both NGRI and GBMI 
insanity verdict options, which can cause confusion for jurors trying to figure out the 
difference between the options given to them. States that use both NGRI and GBMI as 
sentencing options include Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, and Pennsylvania (National Center 
for State Courts, 2004).  The case State v. Gary Allen Rimart (S.C. 1994) exemplifies 
some of these issues.  Rimart was found GBMI and charged with murder. In this case, the 
jurors had the option to also consider NGRI and GBMI, but were not provided 
instructions about their different consequences for the defendant (e.g., conviction vs. not, 
sentence vs. treatment). Rimart appealed the decision in part because of the lack of 
instructions for the jury on the consequences of GBMI and NGRI verdicts. The Supreme 
Court of South Carolina upheld the trial judge’s decision, not requiring instructions to the 
jury regarding the sentencing consequences of different insanity defense verdicts (State v. 
Gary Allen Rimart, 1994).  This issue –whether jurors should be instructed about the 
consequences of various insanity verdict options – is an unsettled area of the law, with 
different precedents in different jurisdictions (see e.g., Shannon vs. U.S., 1994). 
Jury Instructions 
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When a trial has reached the point where jurors are asked to deliberate and decide 
on a verdict, they are given general instructions by the judge about how to apply the law 
and make their decisions.  Instructions can contribute to misunderstanding due to the 
manner of presentation and the legal terminology that is generally unfamiliar to the lay 
public (Severance & Loftus, 1984). Lynch and Haney (2000) found that with death 
penalty instructions a high percentage of participants were unable to correctly identify 
basic concepts. Studies show mixed results looking at the usage of additional jury 
instructions that give jurors a better understanding of defendant outcomes and less usage 
of legal terminology. In insanity cases, the instructions include the definition of what it 
means to be legally insane and the requirements defendants need to meet for the specific 
verdict options available. Adding additional information to juror instructions in insanity 
cases about what will happen to defendants under different verdict options (such as 
between different insanity defense options) has the potential to help jurors make more 
informed decisions in these cases. 
Prior to the enactment of The Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, the Federal 
Court of Appeals disapproved of the usage of jury instruction about the consequences of 
an insanity defense verdict (Ogloff, 1991; Huss, 2013). Thus, jurors were typically not 
given any additional information about consequences to aid in the core fact-finding 
process. After the passing of The Insanity Defense Reform Act, there was a split amongst 
court jurisdictions as to whether juries should be instructed on the consequences of an 
insanity verdict (Piel, 2012).  
There is vigorous debate among state courts about the usage of instructions in 
insanity cases. Some state courts require judges to give instructions to jurors about the 
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consequences of insanity verdicts (i.e., California, Colorado, Florida, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Utah) (Sloat & Frierson, 2005).  This 
additional instruction about consequences of insanity verdicts is provided to reduce juror 
confusion, based on the assumption that the jurors do not have a full comprehension of 
what happens to the defendant after such verdict (Liu, 1993). Other state courts believe 
that jurors should provide the sole function of being a fact finder and that instruction 
about verdict consequences would distract them from their primary fact-finding purpose 
(Wheatman et al, 2001). Therefore, these jurisdictions do not provide the additional 
instructions to jurors about consequences of insanity verdicts (i.e., what will happen to a 
defendant adjudicated as “insane”).   
The case of Shannon vs. U.S. (1994) set the precedent for federal courts on juror 
instructions. Shannon, a convicted felon, was stopped by a police officer and he then told 
the officer that he did not want to live anymore. Shannon then walked across the street, 
pulled a pistol from his coat, and shot himself in the chest. Surviving his suicide attempt, 
Shannon was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon. At trial, Shannon raised the 
insanity defense, and motioned the court to instruct the jury about the consequences of an 
NGRI verdict. The trial court denied Shannon his request, and the jury returned with a 
guilty verdict. Shannon appealed to the Fifth Circuit, where the circuit held that the 
Insanity Defense Reform Act did not change the previously established law in the circuit 
that no juror instruction would be given. He appealed again to the U.S. Supreme Court to 
consider whether federal district courts are required to instruct juries with regard to the 
consequences of an insanity defense verdict. The Supreme Court established that when a 
jury has no sentencing function that judges should not instruct the jury in federal courts.   
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Why is this important? 
Historically, juries decided on the matter of guilt of a defendant without the 
knowledge of the consequences. Generally speaking, jurors have an understanding of the 
sentencing outcomes for a person found guilty of a crime. Jurors have a basic 
understanding about the range of criminal punishments afforded to a defendant found 
guilty of a crime and know that most guilty defendants serve prison or jail time (Piel, 
2012).   
In the case State vs. Becker (2009), Mark Becker was charged with first-degree 
murder for shooting and killing his former football coach. At his trial, experts testified 
that he had paranoid schizophrenia and motioned that the jury be instructed about the 
outcome if Mark Becker was found NGRI. The court refused the motion and gave basic 
instructions (Piel, 2012). The issue surrounding this case was that while deliberating, the 
jury submitted several questions to the district court including one asking about what 
would happen to Mark Becker if the jury found him insane. This request for more 
information was denied, with the court instructing the deliberating jurors not to concern 
themselves with potential consequences of the potential verdicts. The Supreme Court of 
Iowa emphasized the difference between the role of the jury and the judge- that juries are 
finders of fact and the judge is responsible for applying the law and imposing sentences.  
More than 20 jurisdictions have held that the jury should be instructed as to the 
consequences of an insanity verdict, or that an instruction is permitted upon request under 
various circumstances to prevent jury confusion (Piel, 2012). Research on the usage of 
juror instructions in insanity cases shows that they do give jurors a better understanding 
of the insanity defense and the laws that surround it (Elwork et al, 1991). Sloat and 
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Frierson (2005) examined the knowledge and understanding that jurors have about NGRI 
and GBMI, and 84% of participants believed that jurors should be informed of the 
outcome of insanity defense verdicts (i.e. NGRI and GBMI). Few of the participants were 
able to correctly identify the meanings and outcomes for both NGRI and GBMI (4.2%). 
This suggests there is a need for jurors to have more information about the outcomes 
because jurors may decide verdicts partly on what they believe the dispositional outcome 
of the verdict will be.  Thus, there are ripe empirical questions to be answered, including 
whether providing specially designed juror instructions in insanity cases can help jurors 
comprehend their charge (i.e., better understand the legal language and consequences 
associated with different verdict options), and whether better understanding might 
translate into a reduction of the influence of personal biases in jurors’ legal decisions in 
insanity cases. 
Fuzzy Trace Theory  
 Fuzzy Trace Theory theorizes that when individuals are exposed to meaningful 
stimuli it is encoded two different types of representations; a verbatim representation 
which captures the exact information presented (words, numbers or images), and gist 
representation which captures the essential, bottom-line meaning of the stimulus (Reyna 
& Brainerd, 1995). The gist representation involves distinguishing details from the main 
points, for example what is central information for making the specific decision (Blalock 
& Reyna, 2016). People tend to rely on gist rather than verbatim representation and 
research shows that compared to using verbatim reasoning, gist reasoning is associated 
with improved judgement and decision making, and increased adoption of available 
information (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). These types of decision aids have been used in 
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medicine to help patients make better decisions (e.g., Fagerlin et al., 2011), but they have 
been less commonly translated for or studied in the context of legal decision making. The 
current study proposes the usage of juror instructions that facilitate gist-representations as 
a way to assist in juror decision making and reduce reliance on preexisting attitudes.  
Pilot Study 
A pilot study was done to examine insanity verdict options, juror instructions, and 
attitudes toward the insanity defense on juror decision making in an insanity case. 
Previous research has compared mock jurors’ decisions in Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity (NGRI) and Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) verdict option conditions. Both of 
these insanity verdict options (depending on the jurisdiction) are available to triers of fact 
(National Center for State Courts, 2004). No studies could be located that examined 
mock juror decisions with the verdict option Guilty Except Insane (GEI). GEI was 
created as a harsher version of the NGRI for the State of Arizona, and has emerged as 
what could be considered a compromise verdict between NGRI and GBMI (Smith, 2008).  
For this pilot study, we used all three of these insanity defense verdict options, but 
each juror was only shown one of the three verdict options (Not Guilty +  Guilty + one of 
the three insanity verdict options [NGRI, GBMI, GEI]). The M’Naugthen standard was 
held as the standard constant for all conditions. We compared how jurors would decide 
between the different insanity verdict options.   
Participants were also randomly assigned to either receive basic juror instructions 
(Typical Condition) modeled from actual instructions that are given to jurors in a trial or 
more specific instructions (Specific Condition) that included information about the 
outcomes of the verdicts that were presented to them. Additionally, the specific 
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instructions included simple visual depictions of the information designed as decision 
aids, which portray easy-to-interpret, bottom-line “gist” of the information consistent 
with Fuzzy Trace Theory (Reyna & Brainerd, 1995) which states that when an individual 
is exposed to meaningful stimuli both a verbatim representation and gist representation is 
encoded in memory. 
Pilot Study Hypotheses  
1. A main effect of juror instructions was hypothesized, such that more specific 
juror instructions would increase insanity verdict decisions, compared to 
typical juror instructions.  
2. We hypothesized a main effect of verdict condition such that participants who 
saw the GEI option would be more likely to render an insanity verdict than 
participants in the NGRI and GBMI conditions. Specifically, GEI would be 
proportionally picked the most, GBMI would be the second most popular 
(proportionally), and NGRI would be proportionally least picked out of the 
third verdict options. Our reasoning was that GEI holds both retributive and 
rehabilitative aspects -a compromise between NGRI and GBMI (Smith, 
2008), and that participants would see the verdict as one that punishes the 
defendant for the crime that they committed and also gives the defendant 
needed treatment.  
3. We hypothesized an interaction between instructions and verdict condition, 
such that there would be no differences between the insanity defense verdict 
option between conditions in the typical instructions condition, but in the 
specific instructions condition the insanity defense option in the GEI condition 
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will be chosen more compared to the insanity verdict option in the two other 
conditions. GEI will be picked more because it has aspects of both retribution 
and rehabilitation.  
4. Finally, we hypothesized that participants with higher support for the insanity 
defense would be more likely to decide the insanity verdict option than guilty, 
whereas participants with more negative attitudes toward the insanity defense 
would be more likely to decide guilty than the insanity defense verdict option. 
Pilot Study Method 
Participants. For this study, 188 participants were recruited nationwide using 
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Of these 188, 6 participants were removed after failing 
manipulation check questions (n=182). The gender of the sample was 51.4% male, 
ranging in age from 21-61 (M=34, SD=9). The sample was diverse, with ethic 
background of the participants varying as followed: 62% White, 9.5% African-American, 
8.4% Asian, 7.3% Hispanic (White), 2.8% Hispanic (non-white), 1.1% Native American, 
8.9% other.  About a fifth of the sample (19.1%) had previously served on a jury. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to condition in a 2 (instructions 
condition: typical vs. specific) by 3 (insanity verdict option: NGRI, GBMI, or GEI) 
between-subjects design.  Participants were asked to read a trial vignette of a second-
degree murder case in which there was evidence that the defendant was mentally ill at the 
time of a violent offense, and that he had trouble understanding that his actions were 
wrong at the time due to the mental illness (i.e., he thought the victim was an alien). This 
vignette has been used in previous research in Canada (Maeder, McLaughlin, Yamamoto, 
& Zannella, 2016). The vignette was modified to fit the U.S. context (e.g., changing 
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“Crown” to “Prosecution”), and the language for the insanity verdicts and juror 
instructions was modeled after actual U.S. jurisdictions.  The jury instructions in the 
vignette were largely based on the 10th circuit jury model instructions (Committee of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 2011), and all of the additional jury 
instructions for the verdicts are based largely on Georgia Code 17-7-131 with additional 
material for GEI from Arizona 13-3994.  
After reading the case, participants were then asked to render a verdict decision 
based on the information they had received. In each condition, they had the choice 
between Not Guilty, Guilty, or an Insanity Verdict (either NGRI, GBMI, or GEI).  In this 
pilot study, participants did not have the option of more than one insanity verdict option – 
they only saw one. Afterwards, participants also completed the Insanity Defense Attitude 
Scale-Revised (Skeem, Louden, & Evans, 2004), and a basic demographic information 
form after reading through the vignette. Participants were compensated $3.50 for the 30-
minute study.  
Pilot Study Results 
Examining the main effect of juror instructions on mock juror verdicts, the 
hypothesis that those in the specific instruction condition would choose an insanity 
defense verdict more compared to typical instructions was not supported. We found that 
there was not a significant difference between the two conditions, X2 (1, 187) = .10, p= 
.76.  
We posited a main effect of verdict option condition, such that a higher proportion 
of mock jurors in the GEI than in the NGRI condition would select the “insanity” verdict 
option, with GBMI in the middle between GEI and NGRI. Results did not support this 
  18 
hypothesis.  In the NGRI condition, 40.32% chose the NGRI verdict (the rest chose either 
guilty or not guilty), 49.18% of mock jurors in the GBMI condition rendered a GBMI 
verdict, and 45.76% in the GEI condition found the defendant GEI. Proportions and z-
tests were calculated; no significant differences across the three conditions.  
We also hypothesized an interaction between verdict and instruction conditions, 
but neither emerged as significantly related to verdict decisions. As predicted, insanity 
defense attitudes were significantly related to jurors choosing the third verdict option 
(NGRI, GBMI, GEI) rather than a verdict of guilty (b = 0.51, SE = 0.01, Wald X2(1) = 
24.51, p<.001, Exp (B)=1.053 [logistic regression model chi-square (1) = 31.67, 
p<.001]). This pilot study replicated what Louden and Skeem (2001; 2004; 2007) have 
found: that mock jurors’ verdicts in insanity cases are systematically related to their 
attitudes about the mentally ill. The current study further examines this idea. Specific 
juror instructions will be reexamined, but rather than only seeing one insanity defense 
verdict, participants will have the opportunity to compare all three.  
Current Study 
This study extends on the pilot study. It is a 2x1 between-subjects design, with the 
independent variable as type of instructions (specific or typical) and verdict decision as 
the dependent variable. This time, participants were present with all 5 verdict options 
rather than just one of the insanity defense options (Guilty, Not Guilty, NGRI, GBMI, 
and GEI).  
The focus of the current study is to better understand the effect of specific 
instructions in insanity cases. We set out to examine if people who receive specific 
instructions better understand their decision options in these complex cases. Furthermore, 
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we aim to determine whether better understanding (by virtue of the improved gist-based 
instructions with information about consequences) will reduce the effect of jurors’ 
existing attitudes and motivated reasoning on their legal decisions in insanity cases.  
Hypotheses 
1) I hypothesize a main effect of juror instructions, such that participants who 
receive the specific instructions (vs. typical) will better understand the insanity 
defense verdict options.  
2) I hypothesize that type of instructions will affect verdict decisions, such that 
participants in the specific instruction condition will be more likely to choose an 
insanity verdict than the typical instructions condition. 
3) I propose attitudes about the insanity defense and motivated reasoning will bias 
verdict decisions.  People with negative attitudes toward the insanity defense will 
be more likely to interpret the case evidence in ways that point to guilt and will be 
more likely to decide guilty, and those with positive attitudes toward the insanity 
defense will be more likely to interpret the case evidence in ways that point to 
insanity and will be more likely to reach an insanity defense verdict.  
4) I propose that among participants who reach an insanity verdict, those in the 
specific (vs. typical) instruction condition will be systematically more likely to 
choose GEI because the additional instructions will give help them understanding 
GEI has both retributive and rehabilitative aspects. 
5) I hypothesize that mock jurors’ preexisting attitudes about the insanity defense 
will influence verdict decisions through the way they interpret the evidence, and 
that this relationship with be moderated by the type of instruction given to them 
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(specific vs. typical). Mock jurors’ attitudes will bias how they interpret the 
evidence through the process of motivated reasoning. Specifically, people with 
negative attitudes about the insanity defense will show more anti-defense bias in 
their interpretation of the evidence, leading to guilty verdicts. This relationship 
will be stronger for people who receive the typical juror instructions, whereas it 
will be weaker (or nonexistent) for people who receive specific juror instructions. 
Mock jurors in the specific instruction condition will rely less on their preexisting 
attitudes and biased cognitive processing of evidence when deciding the verdict 
than mock jurors in the typical instruction condition.  
Methods 
Participants. Participants were college undergraduate students recruited from 
Arizona State University-West Campus through SONA and also in courses where 
instructors gave extra credit for participating in the study. SONA is a participant pool 
management software system used by many universities.  It provides a system for 
students to sign up for and be compensated with “credits” for their courses for 
participating in research studies.  
An a piori power analysis was conducted to determine the number of participants 
needed for the proposed study. To generate effect sizes to be used in the power analysis 
calculation, three separate analyses were ran from the pilot study data. In the pilot study 
the variables were examined slightly differently then they will be in this study, but they 
were relevant enough to inform this power analysis.  All three analyses showed a small 
effect of instruction condition on verdict decision. Using an effect size calculator with a 
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desired power level of .08, probability level of .05, and a small effect size, with two 
predictors (instructions: typical versus specific), 487 participants were required. 
Five hundred eighty-four participants were recruited for the study. Eighty-eight were 
removed through the attention and manipulation check questions: participants who 
answered two out of the three questions correctly were retained for the analyses (n=496). 
The attention check question gauged participants’ attention.  It read, “I am paying 
attention. As such I am picking the second option below.” Manipulation check questions 
asked participants whether or not they received any additional information in their juror 
instructions and what were the verdict options given to them. Demographic variables are 
summarized in Table 1. The majority of participants were White (51.2%; 5.4% African 
American, 4.8% Non-White Hispanic, 8.3% White Hispanic) and female (77.2%). 
Participants’ average age was 26.8 (SD= 7.1; range 18-56). A little over 10% (10.1%; 
n=50) of participants had previous experience serving on a jury.  
Measures (Appendix D). Most of the questions that were in the questionnaire for 
the pilot study were used in this study. The questionnaire consisted of a verdict decision 
questionnaire where participants rendered a verdict decision out of the five choices 
(Guilty, Not Guilty, NGRI, GBMI, GEI), evidence interpretation questions, 
comprehension questions, the IDA-R scale measuring attitudes toward the insanity 
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Table 1  














Evidence Interpretation Questions. Questions were created to examine the 
weight participants assigned to different pieces of evidence provided in the vignette in 
reaching their verdict decision. Participants were prompted to rate pieces of evidence on 
how important they were in their verdict decision. There were 14 questions about pieces 
of evidence from the vignette: 7 pieces that were against the defense and 7 pieces that 
were for the defense. Jurors were asked to rate how strongly of each piece of information 
influenced their verdict decision. The questions were on a 1-7 scale, 1 being “Strongly 
Disagree” and 7“Strongly Agree.” The 7 questions that were against the defendant were 
negatively coded, the 7 pro-defense questions were positively coded, and all questions 
were combined into one Evidence Interpretation Score.  The questions were combined 
Variables  n % 
Sex    
Male  108 21.8  
Female  382 77.2 
Other  5 1 
    
Race/Ethnicity    
African American   27 5.4 





Hispanic (White)  41 8.3 
Native American  6 1.2 
Pacific Islander  1 .2 
White  254 51.2 
Other  13 2.6 
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into a total score ranging from -42 to 32. Higher positive total scores represented more 
pro-defense reasoning and more negative scores represented more anti-defense reasoning.  
Comprehension Questions. To examine mock jurors understanding of the 
verdicts and the instructions, five multiple questions with only one correct option out of 
five were created about the outcomes of each verdict. Questions were also created to 
examine mock jurors’ perceptions of the process of the deciding the verdict (e.g., ratings 
of helpfulness of the instructions and how confusing the verdict decision making process 
was on Likert scales ranging from 1 to 9).  
Insanity Defense Attitude Scale (IDA-R; Skeem & Goldings, 2001; Skeem, 
Louden, & Evans, 2004). The scale consists of 19 core items rated on a Likert scale, and 
3 supplemental items (that are more general opinion questions). The scale assesses 
individuals’ positive and negative views on the insanity defense and attitudes toward 
people with mental illness. The items on the scale assess two factors: 1) strict liability 
(e.g. ‘I believe that people should be held responsible for their actions no matter what 
their mental condition’) and 2) injustice and danger (e.g. ‘As a last resort, defense 
attorneys will encourage their clients to act strangely and lie through their teeth to appear 
‘“insane”’).  Higher scores on the IDA-R indicate more negative views about the insanity 
defense and towards people with mental illness. The IDA-R has been shown to be 
internally consistent, with coefficient alphas of .88 and .86 for injustice and danger and 
strict liability (Louden & Skeem, 2007). In the pilot study, the coefficient alpha was .94.   
Procedure. Participants completed the study through Qualtrics, an online 
platform for data collection. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two 
conditions (typical or specific instructions). All participants were asked to read through 
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the trial vignette depicting a second-degree murder trial where the defendant pleads 
insanity (Appendix A).  The instructions were presented at the end of the vignette. 
Participants in the typical instructions condition were provided with typical instructions 
(Appendix B), whereas participants in the specific instructions condition were provided 
with additional “consequence” information regarding the different insanity verdict 
options, accompanied by the visual aids to convey the gist of the information (Appendix 
C).  
The insanity defense verdicts in the vignette were randomly ordered for each 
participant to control for order effects. The order in which participants saw the vignette 
and measures was carefully sequenced to control for order effects (see Figure 1). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four orders, in which the materials were 
counterbalanced. Once they completed the study, they were credited with participation 




Figure 1. Study Sequence  
Results 
First, to examine if there were order effects from the order in which participant 
were exposed to the survey elements, analyses compared participants’ results on the IDA-
R, Interpretation of the Evidence questions, and verdicts.  
No significant order effects emerged.  Specifically, ANOVAs revealed no effect 
of survey order on IDA-R total scores, F(3,491) = 1.79, p=.15, Interpretation of the 
Evidence scores, F(3,491) = 1.3, p=.27, or verdict decisions, X2 (3, N = 492) = 3.0, p= .4.  
Hypothesis 1. To examine the effects of instructions on mock jurors’ 
comprehension of the insanity defense verdict options, three independent t-tests were 
conducted (on the comprehension items, on ratings of the helpfulness of the instructions, 
and on ratings of confusion).  
To examine participants’ understanding of the verdicts and the outcomes, the five 
questions pertaining to their knowledge of the definitions and legal outcomes for each 
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verdict were dummy coded, 1 being correct and 0 being incorrect. These were then 
combined to create a total comprehension score, from 0 (not answering any of the 
questions correctly) to 5 (answering all of them correctly). Results supported the 
hypothesis: jurors in the specific instructions conditions correctly answered more verdict 
comprehension questions (M=4.1, SD= 1.1) compared to those in the typical instructions 
condition (M=3.4, SD= 1.2); t(494)= -6.7, p<.001. Table 2 summarizes the percentage of 
correctness for each verdict question for each instruction condition.  
Table 2 










Jurors rated the helpfulness of the instructions from 1 (not at all helpful) to 9 
(very helpful). An independent t-test revealed a significant difference between the two 
conditions: those in the specific instructions condition rated the instructions as more 
helpful (M=7.51, SD= 1.74) than jurors in the typical instructions condition (M= 6.44, 
SD= 1.86); t(494)= -6.64, p<.001, Figure 2.  
Verdicts Typical Instructions Specific Instructions 
   
Not Guilty 83.2% (242) 81.5% (238) 
   
Guilty 69.2% (200) 93.2% (272) 
   
NGRI 77.5% (226) 88.4% (259) 
   
GBMI 35.4% (103) 63.7% (186) 
   
GEI 17% (39) 76.8% (129) 
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Jurors rated how confusing it was to decide a verdict from 1 (not at all confusing) 
to 9 (very confusing). An independent t-test revealed a significant difference between the 
two conditions: jurors in the typical instructions condition found deciding on a verdict 
more confusing (M= 5.8, SD= 2.6) than those in the specific condition (M= 4.6, SD= 
2.8); t(494)= 4.62, p<.001, Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Jurors’ ratings of confusion in each condition.  
 
Hypothesis 2. To examine the effect of instructions on verdict decisions, a binary 
logistic regression was conducted. To directly test the hypothesis that participants in the 
specific instruction condition (coded as “1”) would be more likely to choose an insanity 
verdict option than participants in the typical instruction condition (coded “0”), verdict 
decisions were collapsed into a two-category variable consisting of any insanity defense 
verdict (NGRI, GBMI, GEI combined- coded as “1”) and any non-insanity verdict 
(Guilty and Not Guilty combined- coded as “0”).  Results supported the hypothesis: 
specific instructions significantly increased mock jurors’ likelihood of reaching an  
insanity verdict, b = 0.56, Wald X2(1) = 5.21, p=.023. There was a significant difference 
between the verdicts chosen between the two conditions, x2(1) = 5.28, p=.02, Nagelkerke 
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R2 = .02. Table 3 shows verdict choices between conditions, see Table 4 for more 
information regarding the logistic regression output.  
Table 3 




 Logistic regression model predicting verdict decision in Instruction Condition  
 
Hypothesis 3. To examine if attitudes towards the insanity defense and evidence 
interpretation affects verdict decisions, two analyses were conducted.  
First, to examine the effect of insanity defense attitudes (measured by the IDA-R) 
on verdict decisions, a binary logistic regression was conducted. To directly test the 
hypothesis that participants with more negative attitudes about the insanity defense are 
more likely to reach a guilty verdict over an insanity defense option, verdict decisions 








    
Any insanity verdict (NGRI, 
GBMI, GEI combined) 
83.7% (415) 87.2% (232) 79.6% (183) 
    
Any non-insanity verdict (Guilty 
and Not Guilty combined) 
16.3% (81) 12.8%(34) 20.4% (47) 
    
Predictor  SE  Wald df p Odds ratio 
       
Constant 1.36 .16 69.1 1 <.001 - 
       
Instruction Condition .56 .25 5.21 1 .023 1.75 
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(NGRI, GBMI, GEI combined – coded as “0”) and Guilty (coded as “1”); participants 
that chose not guilty were not used in this analysis.  Results supported the hypothesis: 
negative insanity defense attitudes were significantly associated with mock jurors’ 
likelihood of reaching a guilty verdict, b = 0.05, Wald X2(1) = 36.67, p<.001 [logistic 
regression model x2(1) = 42.6, p<.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .14]. See Table 5 for more 
information regarding the logistic regression. 
  
Table 5 
 Logistic regression model predicting verdict decision from insanity defense attitudes  
 
A binary logistic regression was conducted to examine whether more anti-defense 
evidence interpretation would be associated with a greater likelihood of picking guilty 
compared to an insanity defense. The two-category verdict options variable used in the 
first part of this hypothesis (testing insanity defense attitudes) was again used to examine 
this part of the hypothesis (testing evidence interpretation).  This verdict options variable 
consisted of all the insanity defense verdicts (NGRI, GBMI, GEI – coded as “1”) and 
Guilty (coded as “0”); participants that chose not guilty were not used in this analysis.  
Results supported the hypothesis; people who interpreted the evidence in a more 
anti-defense way were 1.17 times more likely to reach a guilty verdict than an insanity 
verdict, b = 0.16, Wald X2(1) = 74.9, p<.001 [logistic regression model x2(1) = 132.73, 
Predictor  SE  Wald df P Odds ratio 
       
Constant -4.93 .60 71 1 <.001 - 
       
IDA-R Score .05 .01 36.7 1 <.001 1.046 
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p<.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .41]. See Table 6 for more information regarding the logistic 
regression. 
Table 6.  
Logistic regression model predicting verdict decision from Evidence Interpretation 
scores  
 
Hypothesis 4. To examine whether instruction condition systematically helps 
jurors differentiate between different insanity verdict options, logistic regressions were 
conducted. For this analysis, only participants who reached an insanity verdict were 
examined (e.g., NGRI, GBMI, or GEI verdict).  We expected that jurors in the specific 
(vs. typical) instruction condition would be systematically more likely to choose a GEI 
verdict, likely because they would understand the differences between these three 
insanity verdicts and would situate GEI as a compromise verdict with both the retributive 
aspects of GBMI and the rehabilitative aspects of NGRI.   
Results robustly supported the hypothesis.  First, an omnibus binary logistic 
regression with instruction condition as the independent variable and a two-level insanity 
verdict categorical variable (GEI coded as “1” and NGRI + GBMI combined coded as 
“0”) revealed that mock jurors in the specific instruction condition were 4.62 times more 
likely to reach a GEI verdict than participants in the typical instruction condition, b = 
Predictor  SE  Wald df p Odds ratio 
       
Constant 2.75 .23 139.5 1 <.001 - 
       
Interpretation of the Evidence 
Score 
.16 .02 74.9 1 <.001 1.17 
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1.53, Wald X2(1) = 46.86, p< .001 [logistic regression model x2(1) = 51.87, p< .001, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .16]. See Table 7 for more information regarding the logistic regression. 
Follow-up targeted contrasts to examine whether participants were more likely to 
reach a GEI verdict than an NGRI verdict and a GBMI verdict in the specific vs. typical 
conditions were conducted.  Each test further supported the hypothesis.  Participants in 
the specific (vs. typical) instructions condition were 5.42 times more likely to reach a 
GEI than GBMI verdict, b = 1.70, Wald X2(1) = 51.24, p< .001 [logistic regression model 
x2(1) = 56.66, p=<.001, Nagelkerke R2 = .20.  And participants in the specific (vs. 
typical) instructions condition were 2.77 times more likely to reach a GEI than NGRI 
verdict, b = 1.02, Wald X2(1) = 10.0, p= .002 [logistic regression model x2(1) = 9.88, 
p=.002 x, Nagelkerke R2 = .06.  See Table 7 for more information regarding the logistic 
regression. 
Table 7 




Predictor  SE  Wald df p Odds ratio 
       
Constant -1.31 .18 52.36 1 <.001 - 
       
GEI vs GBMI & NGRI 1.53 .22 46.86 1 <.001 4.62 
       
Constant -1.11 .18 35.93 1 <.001 - 
       
GEI vs GBMI 1.70 .24 51.24 1 <.001 5.42 
       
Constant .40 .25 2.56 1 .109 - 
       
GEI vs NGRI 1.02 .32 10.0 1 .002 2.77 
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Hypothesis 5. A moderated mediation analysis was conducted to examine the 
hypothesis that preexisting attitudes about the insanity defense influences verdict decision 
through the interpretation of the evidence, moderated by instruction condition. IDA-R 
total scores served as the predictor variable, interpretation of evidence scores served as 
the mediator, and instruction condition was the moderator (Specific coded as “1” and 
Typical coded as “0”). Verdict served as the dependent variable, collapsed into a two 
category variable comparing all the insanity defense verdicts (NGRI, GBMI, GEI) to 
Guilty, with Not Guilty was coded as system-missing.  A moderated mediation analysis 
was done through PROCESS, Model 8.  
 The hypothesis was not supported: instructions did not moderate the relationship 
between IDA-R scores and verdict, nor did it moderate the mediation relationship 
between IDA-R scores influencing verdicts through how the evidence was interpreted, 
see Figure 4. The pathway from attitudes to interpretation of the evidence was significant 
(a = -.38, SE = .03, 95% CI = -.45, -. 32), such that more negative attitudes toward the 
insanity defense are associated with motivated reasoning against the defense. The 
pathway from interpretation of the evidence to verdict was significant (b = .15, SE = .02, 
95% CI = 0.11, 0.2) such that motivated reasoning against the defense is associated with 
























Figure 4. Moderated mediation analysis for Hypothesis 5, examining the moderating 
effect of instruction condition (typical vs. specific) on the relationship of insanity defense 
attitudes influencing verdict through how the evidence is interpreted.  
 
Discussion 
Due to the misperceptions that surround the insanity defense, defendants who 
raise the defense and plead insanity are faced with significant challenges to how it will be 
perceived by jurors. Most jurors lack knowledge of the outcomes of insanity defense 
verdicts, often believing the defense is a ‘loophole’ for defendants to avoid punishment 
for their crimes (Bloechl et al., 2007). Adding juror instructions that include an 
understandable description of the outcomes is proposed in the current study to lessen the 





















.-.37, p=.8  
Direct effect of attitudes on verdict = -.02, p = .13 
Interaction between Instructions and Attitudes on Verdict = .02, p=.41 
-.02, p=.13 
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Our findings suggest that giving jurors specific instructions with a simple visual 
aid increases their comprehension of complex verdict options in insanity cases. Jurors 
given specific instructions in this study found the process to be less confusing and more 
helpful compared to those that received the typical instructions. Additionally, they 
remembered and comprehended significantly more information from the instructions 
compared to those in the typical instruction condition. One reason for these findings 
could be that the specific instructions gave jurors a better understanding of what actually 
happens to individuals that are acquitted by the insanity defense. Often people have 
negative perceptions of the insanity defense because of the lack of information available 
about the outcome of insanity defense cases and the erroneous assumptions jurors make 
about what happens to defendants that are adjudicated insane (Liu, 1993).  
In this study, jurors in the specific condition knew what would happen to the 
defendant for each of the potential verdict options, meaning that they did not have to 
make erroneous assumptions. There is a legal debate about whether jurors should be 
given outcome information in their instructions, with some jurisdictions holding that it 
deters from the fact-finding role of the juror (Piel, 2012). The findings from the current 
study suggests that allowing outcome information into the jury instructions can help 
jurors make more informed decisions. Furthermore, jurors preferred the specific 
instructions– they found them more helpful and less confusing than typical instructions.  
This research sheds some light into the processes involved in insanity defense 
verdict decision making. In jurisdictions where jurors are provided with more than one 
insanity verdict option (e.g., Alaska, Georgia, Indiana, and Pennsylvania; National Center 
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for State Courts, 2004), more detailed information about each of the outcomes may 
alleviate verdict confusion. Without the additional information jurors may be making 
assumptions about what each verdict outcome entails, using their attitudes and biases to 
guide these assumptions. Whereas allowing jurors to understand what would happen to 
the defendant for each verdict option would assist in clarification of confusing and vague 
terminology. The results show that when mock jurors are given the additional 
information about the multiple verdicts, they are more likely to pick GEI compared to the 
other insanity defense options. One reason for why this occurred is because the GEI 
outcome has both retributive and rehabilitative aspects, and participants believed that the 
verdict as a middle ground where they can punish the defendant for the crime but also 
treat the mental illness. Showing that participants do want to treatment defendants that 
they know has a mental illness but not at the cost of no incarceration. Further research 
needs to be conducted to explore this effect and the role that information plays in 
punishing mentally ill criminals.  
The findings show that attitudes and cognitively biased reasoning processes 
significantly influence verdict decisions. Those with more negative attitudes toward the 
insanity defense and anti-defendant reasoning processes were more likely to reach guilty 
verdicts. Participants with more positive attitudes toward the insanity defense and more 
pro-defense reasoning processes were more likely to reach an insanity verdict. These 
finding suggests jurors rely on preexisting attitudes and biases and that additional 
information given in the specific instructions did not overcome the effects of preexisting 
attitudes and biases on verdict decision making. Further research needs to be done to 
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examine interventions that can reduce jurors’ reliance on their attitudes and biases when 
making their decisions, especially in controversial cases like insanity defense cases that 
are deeply rooted in negative misconceptions.  
Changes are needed to improve the existing template that is used to instruct 
jurors. Previous research has shown the effectiveness of additional instructions, and that 
there is a need for jurors to have more comprehensive instructions (Piel, 2012; Sloat & 
Frieison, 2005). This current study examined juror instructions accompanied with simple 
visual aids to convey the gist of complicated legalese. The revised instructions provided 
in this study did increase comprehension and subjective perceptions of helpfulness and 
reduction in confusion.  But the intervention did not reduce jurors’ reliance on preexisting 
attitudes and cognitively biased reasoning processes when deciding on a verdict.  
Limitations  
As with all research, there are a number of limitations with the current study. One 
is that the participants were a homogenous sample of undergraduate students (largely 
White and female). This sample may not be generalizable to the public. Further studies 
including more representative populations should be conducted to confirm the results of 
the study.  
Additionally, the results from the pilot study are different to what was found in 
the current study; the pilot study found no effect of the specific instructions on verdict 
decisions. One reason for this could be sample that was used; MTurk was used for the 
pilot study and there was a more diverse sample. One way to be able to examine if this 
would have an effect on the results would be to do another study with an MTurk or a 
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community sample rather than undergraduate students. Additionally, the current study 
examined if the instruction increased comprehension whereas the pilot study did not 
examine that relationship. Therefore, this study should be replicated on a more 
representative sample to confirm the results.  
Another limitation involves the measurement of mock jurors’ comprehension, 
which was a series of five multiple choice questions pertaining to jurors understanding of 
what would happen to the defendant depending on the verdict. These questions did tap 
into an aspect of jurors’ comprehension (understanding on outcomes), but does not look 
at other aspects, for example jurors understanding of legal insanity. Creating a broader set 
of questions addressing juror comprehension may be a way to assist with this, as well as 
having pre- and post-questions after the instructions are given to mock jurors to gauge 
what information that actually did learn from the instructions given to them.  
Future Directions 
 Research needs to be conducted to further examine the effect of specific 
instructions accompanied with visual aids on assisting jurors with their verdict decisions. 
The instructions that were created were effective at increasing comprehension and 
decreasing confusion. Specific instructions should be examined outside of the insanity 
defense context to see if the specific Fuzzy Trace Theory-inspired instructions can be 
effectively implemented in different types of cases.  
 The goal of the study was to reduce bias and the effect of attitudes on insanity 
defense cases, and that was not fully accomplished. Further research needs to be 
conducted to find better ways to reduce this effect. The use of deliberation in future 
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studies may be able to address this. The ability to deliberate with fellow jurors may allow 
for the discussion of the instructional information amongst jurors, thus allowing for more 
information to be absorbed from the instructions.  Research has also shown that 
deliberations reduce jurors’ reliance on their biases when rendering verdicts as a group 
and have a better understanding on the instructions (Diamond et al., 2006). Therefore, 
future studies should explore the effect of deliberation to see if there is improvement in 
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Judge’s Opening Instructions to the Jury 
 
At the end of the trial I will give you detailed guidance on the law and on how you will 
go about reaching your decision. But now I simply want to generally explain how the trial 
will proceed. 
This criminal case has been brought by the State. I will sometimes refer to the 
government as the Prosecution. Mr. Miller is represented by his attorney, called the 
Defense. 
 
The indictment charges the defendant with the second-degree murder of Mr. Alex 
Hughes. The indictment is simply the description of the charge made by the state 
government against the defendant; it is not evidence of guilt or anything else. The 
defendant is presumed innocent. He may not be found guilty unless you determine that 
the government has proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
You are to consider all the evidence received in this trial. It will be up to you to decide 
what evidence to believe and how much of any witness's testimony to accept or reject.  
After you have heard all the evidence on both sides, the Prosecution and the Defense will 
each be given time for their final arguments. 
 
It is important that you wait until all the evidence is received and you have heard my 
instructions on the controlling rules of law before you reach your verdict.  
 


























Prosecution Opening Statement 
 
On the night of December 10th, 2014, Jordan Miller stabbed and killed Alex Hughes. The 
facts meet the elements of second-degree murder; this is not in dispute by either side. The 
defendant further, by his own admission, knew that he was committing murder, and that 
murder is illegal. Thus, his action and admission satisfy all of the elements necessary to 
convict him of second-degree murder.  
 
The reason we are here today is to determine how the defendant is going to be held 
responsible for his actions. In pleading insanity, the Defense actually assumes the burden 
of proof. It is true that the Prosecution always assumes the burden of proof in establishing 
guilt versus innocence, because the defendant is assumed to be innocent until proven 
guilty. However, the law has established that the defendant is assumed to be mentally 
intact unless the Defense can prove otherwise. In other words, the burden for proving 
criminal responsibility rests with the Defense, not with the Prosecution. In this case, the 
Defense would have you believe that at the time of the offense, the defendant, Mr. Miller, 
was extremely mentally ill. But while you’re listening to this testimony, I urge you to 
remember that the simplest explanation tends to be the right one. After you have seen the 
evidence you will understand that Mr. Miller is simply a violent person who snapped on 
his roommate during an argument that got so heated a neighbor overheard and called the 
police.  
 
Although you will hear psychological testimony that, according to the words of the 
defendant, he was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the Prosecution will show that 
actions speak louder than words in this case. You will hear testimony that the defendant 
stole money from the victim, and was preparing to skip town to avoid apprehension by 
the police. These are the actions of a person who knows he did something wrong but 
doesn’t want to answer for it. Members of the jury, while Mr. Miller may have done an 
act that you and I believe only a sick individual could do, he was mentally intact when he 
did so. Don’t accept the Defense’s farfetched fiction, the only evidence about which 
comes from a violent offender’s claims, but instead hold him responsible. We ask you to 


















Defense Opening Statement 
 
Members of the jury, Jordan Miller suffers from a very severe mental illness known as 
paranoid schizophrenia. The composed, seemingly rational person you see before you is a 
product of anti-psychotic medication.  However, you have all heard the idiom, ‘never 
judge a book by its cover.’  To judge the inner workings of Mr. Miller’s mind and mental 
illness based on his external appearance while he is on anti-psychotic medication is a 
grave mistake. You will hear medical testimony showing that the defendant has been 
positively diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.   
 
Mr. Miller’s actions were, in his mind, truly justified. The rationality of his belief, given 
his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, is not the legal question to be decided here 
today. If a person kills another under a delusion that the salvation of the human race 
depends on it, then his action might be ‘legally wrong’, but it is not ‘wrong’ if we mean 
‘morally wrong’. The law is clear about this, members of the jury. A mental disease 
caused him to think that killing another person was the only option. If you, the jury, feel 
that Mr. Miller was not in his right mind and that he believed his actions were morally 
justified, then you must find that the defendant insane.  
 
To return an insanity verdict you do not need to understand what he believed; surely, no 
sane person would believe that his loved ones have been replaced by alien imposters. 
What you do need to understand is why he believed what he did. The answer to that point 
is a severe mental illness or disease known as paranoid schizophrenia. It was only 
because of this mental illness that he stabbed Mr. Hughes. Keeping these facts in mind, 

























Prosecution Witness, Officer Mark Hanes 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you please state your name and occupation?   
Hanes: My name is Mark Hanes, and I am the police officer who was the first to arrive 
on scene on the day in question. I was also the officer that later arrested Jordan Miller.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you please describe the events that took place on the evening 
of December 10th?   
Hanes: At approximately 8:40 pm I responded to a 911 call from a neighbor about a 
disturbance at the apartment of Alex Hughes and Jordan Miller. When I arrived, the door 
was open, and the victim, Mr. Hughes, was lying on the floor in the kitchen. I could see 
that the Mr. Hughes had lost a lot of blood, and I immediately called for medical 
assistance. Mr. Hughes was pronounced dead shortly after arriving at the hospital, and the 
cause of death was noted as multiple stab wounds to the neck and chest.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: What happened next?  
Hanes: We interviewed the neighbor who had called 911. We learned from this person 
that Mr. Hughes had a roommate, Jordan Miller. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Was the defendant, Jordan Miller, there at that time? 
Hanes:  No he was not.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney: When and where did you find Mr. Miller?  
Hanes: At approximately 9:15 we found Mr. Miller at the home of his mother, Mrs. 
Miller. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Can you describe what happened next? 
Hanes: We arrived at the home of Mrs. Miller, and identified ourselves as police officers. 
Mrs. Miller indicated that Mr. Miller was in his childhood bedroom. When we went to his 
room, it was evident the defendant was quickly attempting to pack some belongings. We 
let Mr. Miller know that we needed to ask him some questions pertaining to Alex 
Hughes. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Did the defendant comply with your instructions?  
Hanes:  No he did not. Mr. Miller attempted to flee through the bedroom window, which 
was on the ground level of the house. At that time we apprehended Mr. Miller and took 
him in for questioning. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Did you find anything of note at Mrs. Miller’s home? 
Hanes: Yes. We found a butcher’s knife, which we later identified as the murder 
weapon. Mr. Miller had cleaned the knife in the bathroom sink. We also recovered a 
wallet, which contained $200 cash and several cards; it belonged to the victim, Mr. 
Hughes. 
Prosecuting Attorney: So, to summarize, Mr. Miller was attempting to pack his 





Hanes: Yes.  
 
Defense Cross-examination:    
 
Defense Attorney: What was Mr. Miller’s demeanor at the time you arrived at his 
house?      
Hanes:  He seemed frantic, and unsettled by sudden police presence.  
 
Defense Attorney : Did he say anything?     
Hanes:  He shouted something to the effect of: “Get away from me, don’t let them take 







































Defense Witness, Dr. Devin Cassady 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you please state your name and occupation for the court?    
Cassady:  I’m Dr. Devin Cassady. I’m a psychologist working at the Forensic Mental 
Health Institute.    
 
Defense Attorney:  What are your credentials? 
Cassady:  I earned my Ph.D. in clinical psychology and later became board-certified in 
forensic psychology by the American Board of Professional Psychology. I’ve been a 
forensic psychologist for over 20 years now. 
 
Defense Attorney:  Have you spoken extensively with the defendant, Jordan Miller?  
Cassady: Yes. I conducted a full psychological assessment of Mr. Miller. 
 
Defense Attorney: What did you learn from this assessment? 
Cassady: Based on a psychological and medical history, a standardized questionnaire, 
and my own more detailed interview, it is my professional opinion that Mr. Miller meets 
the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia, paranoid type. 
 
Defense Attorney: Can you describe for the courts what exactly ‘schizophrenia’ is?  
Cassady:  Schizophrenia is a severe brain disorder in which people interpret reality 
abnormally. Schizophrenia may result in some combination of hallucinations, delusions, 
and extremely disordered thinking and behavior. Hallucinations involve perceiving 
something with one of your five senses when that something isn’t really there, such as 
hearing voices when no one is actually speaking.  Delusions are fixed, false beliefs - 
believing something that isn’t true, a firm belief that can’t be altered even in the face of 
proof.  The origins of schizophrenia are not yet fully understood by scientists, but its 
potential debilitating effects are well documented.  
 
Defense Attorney:  Could you please tell the jury some details about how someone is 
diagnosed with schizophrenia, and what that means? 
Cassady: Well, first you must rule out other mental health disorders and determine that 
the symptoms aren't due to substance abuse, medication, or a medical condition. In 
addition, a person must have at least two of a specific set of symptoms outlined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (also called the ‘DSM’), and those 
symptoms would be present for most of the time during a one-month period, with some 
level of disturbance being present over six months. We look for things like delusions, 
hallucinations, disorganized speech (indicating disorganized thinking), and extremely 
disorganized behavior. 
 
Defense Attorney:  What did you learn, during your assessment, about Mr. Miller’s 
behavior on the day in question?  
Cassady:  Mr. Miller suffers from what is called “Capgras Delusion”, a relatively rare 
type of delusion that can occur in patients with paranoid schizophrenia. The key feature 





identical looking imposters. Mr. Miller indicated to me that he believed that an alien 
imposter had replaced his roommate. Further, he stated he believed that an alien imposter 
had transplanted a chip into his brain. This chip, Mr. Miller believed, was responsible for 
his hearing of Mr. Hughes’s voice even when Mr. Hughes was not present. Mr. Miller 
told me he suspected that aliens were conspiring to take over the planet, and that the Mr. 
Hughes imposter was attempting to extract information from his mind. He remarked to 
me that he began to suspect this was the case a couple of months prior, when he came 
home to find that Mr. Hughes had moved the TV to a different spot in the room. 
 
Defense Attorney: In your discussions with Mr. Miller about the night in question, what 
did he tell you?     
Cassady: He recalled that he and Mr. Hughes were talking in the kitchen, and that he 
heard a knock on the door. He believed that Mr. Hughes intended to take him away to a 
secret facility that night, and that he had to kill him to get away.  
 
Defense Attorney: In your opinion, is Mr. Miller trying to mislead you into believing he 
has schizophrenia?     
Cassady:  No I do not. Mr. Miller presented with classic symptoms of schizophrenia, and 
in particular, Capgras delusion.  
 
Prosecution Cross-Examination  
 
Prosecuting Attorney:   Are you an expert in deception, Dr. Cassady?  
Cassady:  No, I am not. But I have many years of experience treating real illnesses, and 
the ability to detect malingering is part of the job. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney: Is that because people sometimes lie, and try to trick their doctor 
into diagnosing them with an illness? 
Cassady:  It’s a possibility, but to my knowledge it is not all that common. Capgras 
Delusion specifically is not necessarily well known to most people, so it wouldn’t really 
be something one would fake easily. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  But, wasn’t your diagnosis just based on what the defendant told 
you, after some time had passed following the incident?  
Cassady:  No. I conducted a full psychological assessment. From this assessment, which 
included a retrospective examination of records from earlier in Mr. Miller’s life - 
including records from the time of the crime - it is my opinion that Mr. Miller’s behavior 
was consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  But in fact, you didn’t even interview Mr. Miller until two full 
weeks after the crime had occurred, isn’t that right?  
Cassady:  Yes that’s correct.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Do you think that is enough time for someone to research the 





Cassady: I don’t really know – I couldn’t speak to the defendant’s activities during that 
time. 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Yet you can be confident about his mental state at the time of the 
crime? That he has this bizarre, specific delusion based only on a description of his 
activities?  
Cassady:  I conducted a full psychological assessment. That means that I had to take into 
account a lot of factors, not just Mr. Miller’s word. I looked for things like certain speech 
patterns, emotional expression, thinking, and perception spanning the months leading up 
to the incident and at the time of assessment. We’re not just looking for what patients say, 
but looking too at other records as collateral sources that document how patients behave 
over time – it’s not as simple as just making up stories. 
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  So, you’re saying that the victim believed aliens replaced his 
roommate and he had to escape quickly, but he still felt he had time to take the victim’s 
wallet? Was that part of this ‘delusion’ as well?  
Cassady: The point is that Mr. Miller’s behaviors were erratic, frantic, because he was 
under the influence of paranoid delusions. For example, he indicated that if the police 
captured him, the aliens could get to him easily. Although the behavior is irrational to a 
person who is well, it is reasonable to suspect that taking the wallet somehow played into 
those delusions.  
 
Prosecuting Attorney:  Speaking of mental health history, to your knowledge, has the 
defendant ever been hospitalized for paranoid delusions before the incident?  
Cassady: No he has not. 
 




Defense Attorney: Dr. Cassady, is it surprising to you that Mr. Miller would not have 
spent time in a mental health facility? 
Cassady: Not necessarily. Among men, onset of schizophrenia typically occurs during 
early to mid 20’s. Even if Mr. Miller, who was 25 at the time of the alleged crime, began 
experiencing disturbances before the incident, he would not likely have understood the 
need to seek treatment. Having moved out of his family home, his family would not have 














Prosecution Closing Statement 
 
Mr. Hughes woke up on December 10th, excited to finish his last exam before the 
holidays and soon go home to friends and family. He was a good student, and had many 
exciting plans in store, but instead, his life was cut short. I would like to remind you, 
ladies and gentlemen, that Mr. Miller does not deny intentionally ending Mr. Hughes’s 
life. So, you don’t need to take my word for it, instead you can take this information 
directly from the defendant. The disturbing truth is that Mr. Miller is a dangerous, cold-
blooded killer. Frustrated with his roommate, he snapped and violently silenced Mr. 
Hughes. He knew that it was illegal, and he knew he would get in trouble. We can clearly 
see this because he took some quick cash from the victim, fled the scene, and even 
cleaned the murder weapon. Once he got caught red-handed he had to come up with a 
good story. Members of the jury, do not fall for his fanciful story. What is likely: that the 
defendant suddenly experienced paranoid delusions even though we have no evidence of 
this? The defense is so insistent that these outlandish beliefs explain Mr. Miller’s 
behavior, and yet you didn’t hear from a single witness who could attest to any strange 
behavior in the months leading up to the crime. Is it more plausible that he is just a 
violent person who lost his cool when he argued with his roommate one too many times? 
Not one piece of evidence was introduced, besides the defendant’s own account, that he 
had a mental disease at the time of the event. What we do have is overwhelming evidence 
of second-degree murder: the body of Mr. Hughes, a murder weapon, the defendant’s 
belongings in Mr. Miller’s room, and even a direct admission. While the forensic 
psychologist you heard from might not be able to tell when someone is faking an illness, 
I have every confidence that you can, members of the jury, and that you will return the 

























Defense Closing Statement 
 
This is a very tragic case, ladies and gentlemen; there is no doubt that. Mr. Miller also 
deeply feels the loss of his best friend and roommate, Mr. Hughes. The real culprit here is 
mental illness. We have shown you beyond a shadow of a doubt that Mr. Miller did not 
know his act was wrong. You heard testimony from a very experienced doctor describing 
an undisputed diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia. The Prosecution would have you 
believe that because Mr. Miller’s account is so bizarre, it can only be a piece of fiction. 
But after hearing Dr. Cassady’s testimony, you can understand that the reason these 
beliefs sound so far-fetched to you or me is because they came from a mind that is 
unwell. Don’t fall into the trap of attempting to understand Mr. Miller’s delusion. The 
Prosecution is trying to distract you from the real legal issue at hand: namely, whether 
Mr. Miller believed these things because of a mental illness. Trust in an expert’s full 
assessment that was based on a lot more information than you’ve heard in this case. It 
was based on years of training, experience, and study of mental health as well as other 
sources in Mr. Miller’s history. Let us not punish Mr. Miller for being the unlucky 
recipient of a mental disease that consumed his life and left him in fear for it. What Mr. 
Miller really needs to receive is mental health care from trained medical professionals 
who understand how the brain works. I trust you, members of the jury, to follow the law 
in this case. The law tells us that if a person did not knowingly and intentionally commit 
a crime, then you must find so, plain and simple. This doesn’t mean he can just walk out 
of here, it just means that we recognize something that was so beyond his control. This 
isn’t a case of evil, but rather it is a case of illness. While Mr. Miller did not have the 
choice to act rationally at the time of the crime, you have a choice here and now; the 








































































Typical Condition Juror Instructions 
 
Judge’s Closing Instructions to the Jury  
 
The defendant is charged in the indictment with murder in the second degree in violation 
of Section 1111 of Title 18 of the State Code.  In order for the defendant to be found 
guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, the defendant unlawfully killed Alex Hughes; and 
Second, the defendant killed Alex Hughes with malice aforethought. 
 
To kill with malice aforethought means to kill either deliberately and intentionally or 
recklessly and with extreme disregard for human life.  
 
If you conclude that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime charged, you must then consider whether the defendant 
should be found insane.  There are three different types of insanity verdicts to consider: 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Guilty but Mentally Ill, and Guilty Except Insane. 
Mental illness may be temporary or permanent. You may consider evidence of the 
defendant's mental condition before, during, and after the crime, in deciding whether he 
was mentally ill at the time of the crime. Unlike other aspects of a criminal trial, the 
defendant has the burden of proving an insanity defense. The defendant does not have to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes it highly probable that the 
defendant was insane. You should render one of the insanity verdicts if you find, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the defendant was insane when he committed the crime 
charged.  
For you to return an insanity verdict, the defendant must prove 1) that he suffered from a 
severe mental disease or defect when he committed the crime; and (2) that, as a result of 
this mental disease or defect, he was not able to understand what he was doing or to 
understand that it was wrong.  
  
Under the law, a person found “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” is not criminally 
liable for his conduct while insane. Insanity is therefore a defense to the crime charged. 
The defendant has presented evidence of insanity at the time he committed the crime 
charged.  
 
Under the law, a person found “Guilty But Mentally Ill” remains criminally liable for his 
conduct under the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict. GBMI is therefore not a full 
defense to the crime charged. The defendant has presented evidence of mental illness at 






Under the law, a person found “Guilty Except Insane” remains criminally liable for his 
conduct while insane. Guilty Except Insane is therefore a not a full defense to the crime 
charged. The defendant has presented evidence of insanity at the time he committed the 
crime charged.  
Although the defendant has raised the issue of insanity, the government still has the 
burden of proving all of the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Remember that there are five possible verdicts in this case: Guilty, Not 









































































Specific Condition Juror Instructions 
 
Judge’s Closing Instructions to the Jury  
 
The defendant is charged in the indictment with murder in the second degree in violation 
of Section 1111 of Title 18 of the State Code.  In order for the defendant to be found 
guilty of that charge, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond 
a reasonable doubt: 
 
First, the defendant unlawfully killed Alex Hughes; and 
Second, the defendant killed Alex Hughes with malice aforethought. 
 
To kill with malice aforethought means to kill either deliberately and intentionally or 
recklessly and with extreme disregard for human life.  
 
If you conclude that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime charged, you must then consider whether the defendant 
should be found insane.  There are three different types of insanity verdicts to consider: 
Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Guilty but Mentally Ill, and Guilty Except Insane. 
Mental illness may be temporary or permanent. You may consider evidence of the 
defendant's mental condition before, during, and after the crime, in deciding whether he 
was mentally ill at the time of the crime. Unlike other aspects of a criminal trial, the 
defendant has the burden of proving an insanity defense. The defendant does not have to 
prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but only by clear and convincing evidence. 
Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes it highly probable that the 
defendant was insane. You should render one of the insanity verdicts if you find, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the defendant was insane when he committed the crime 
charged.  
For you to return an insanity verdict, the defendant must prove 1) that he suffered from a 
severe mental disease or defect when he committed the crime; and (2) that, as a result of 
this mental disease or defect, he was not able to understand what he was doing or to 
understand that it was wrong.  
  
Under the law, a person found “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” is not criminally 
liable for his conduct while insane. Insanity is therefore a defense to the crime charged. 
The defendant has presented evidence of insanity at the time he committed the crime 
charged.  
 
Under the law, a person found “Guilty But Mentally Ill” remains criminally liable for his 
conduct under the Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI) Verdict. GBMI is therefore not a full 
defense to the crime charged. The defendant has presented evidence of mental illness at 






Under the law, a person found “Guilty Except Insane” remains criminally liable for his 
conduct while insane. Guilty Except Insane is therefore a not a full defense to the crime 
charged. The defendant has presented evidence of insanity at the time he committed the 
crime charged.  
Although the defendant has raised the issue of insanity, the government still has the 
burden of proving all of the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Remember that there are five possible verdicts in this case: Guilty, Not 
Guilty, Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity, Guilty But Mentally Ill, and Guilty Except 
Insane. 
 
Not Guilty By Reasons of Insanity (NGRI)  
• I charge you that should you find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity at 
the time of the crime, the defendant will be committed to a secure state mental 
health facility until such time, if ever, that the court is satisfied that he should be 
released pursuant to law.  To satisfy the court that he should be released, the 
defendant must show that he is no longer mentally ill or a danger to society.  
Guilty But Mentally Ill (GMBI) 
• I charge you that should you find the defendant guilty but mentally ill at the time 
of the crime, the defendant will be sentenced and placed in the custody of the 
Department of Corrections which will have responsibility for the evaluation and 
treatment of the mental health needs of the defendant, which may include, at the 
discretion of the Department of Corrections, referral for temporary hospitalization 
at a facility operated by the Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental 
Disabilities.  The defendant will be released from the Department of Corrections 
at the end of his sentence. 
Guilty Except Insane (GEI)  
• I charge you that should you find the defendant guilty except insane at the time of 
the crime, the defendant will be sentenced with the same sentence he would have 
received if he had not been found insane.  He will be placed under the jurisdiction 
of the psychiatric security review board and committed to a secure mental health 
facility for that term, which can be extended if the defendant remains mentally ill 
or dangerous at the expiration of his sentence.  Should the defendant no longer 
need ongoing treatment for mental illness during that term, and if he is continues 
to pose a danger to society, the board shall order him to be transferred to the 
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JUROR QUESTIONS 
 
To what degree do you believe the defendant has a mental illness?                 
0 - 100% _________ 
To what extent should the defendant be blamed for his actions?              
  0 - 100% _________ 
To what extent did the defendant have control of his actions?                             
   0 - 100% _________    
To what extent does the defendant need treatment for his mental illness?        
  0 - 100% _________    
To what extent should the defendant be punished for his actions?                      
  0 - 100% _________                                 
To what degree do you believe the defendant physically killed the victim (setting aside 
the issue of mental state)?                          
0 - 100% _________ 
Do you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
charged, second-degree murder? 
______ Yes             ______ No 
To what degree do you believe the Defense showed that the defendant was insane at the 
time of the crime?  
0 - 100% _________ 
Do you believe that the Defense showed, by clear and convincing evidence, that the 
defendant was insane at the time of the crime?   
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What is your verdict? 
_____ Guilty      ______ Not Guilty  ______ Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity (NGRI) 
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INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE QUESTIONS 
 
For the following questions, you will find statements about pieces of evidence that were 
introduced during the trial in this case.  We would like to know how much each piece of 
evidence influenced your verdict decision in this case.  Please rate how much you agree 
that each piece of evidence influenced your verdict.  To the right of each statement is a 
rating scale. You may interpret the seven points on this scale as follows: 
 
____1_____/_____2____/____3____/____4____/_____5____/_____6____/______7__ 
STRONGLY DISAGREE SLIGHTLY  NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY   AGREE   STRONGLY 
  DISAGREE                       DISAGREE                          AGREE                            AGREE  
 
After reading each statement, please indicate the response that comes closest to saying 




1. When the police found the defendant in his room at his 
mother’s house, he was quickly attempting to pack some 
belongings. 
 
2. Jordan Miller suffers from a very severe mental illness 
known as paranoid schizophrenia, including a rare 
“Capgras” delusion in which he believed that his loved 
ones have been replaced by identical-looking imposters. 
Mr. Miller believed that aliens were conspiring to take over 
the planet, and that his roommate, Mr. Hughes, had been 
replaced by an alien imposter who was attempting to 
extract information from Mr. Miller’s mind. 
 
3. When Mr. Miller was told by the police that they needed to 
ask him some questions pertaining to the victim, he 
attempted to flee through the bedroom window. 
 
4. On the night of the offense, Mr. Miller and Mr. Hughes 
were talking in the kitchen, and when Mr. Miller heard a 
knock on the door he believed that meant Mr. Hughes 
intended to take him away to a secret facility that night. 
Given this delusional belief, Mr. Miller believed had to kill 
Mr. Hughes in order to save his own life. 
 
 
5. The police found a butcher’s knife in the defendant’s 
mother’s house, which was later identified as the murder 
weapon. The defendant had cleaned the knife in the 
bathroom sink. 
Disagree                Agree               
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6. When the police arrived at his house, Mr. Miller was 
unsettled by the sudden police presence and shouted 
something to the effect of: “Get away from me, don’t let 
them take me” and tried to run from them as if he thought 
they were aliens too.   
 
7. The police found the victim’s wallet, which contained $200 
cash and several cards, in the defendant’s room at his 
mother’s house. 
 
8. Mr. Miller cleaned the butcher knife and stole the wallet to 
“hide his tracks” from what he believed were aliens so he 
















1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
9. Dr. Cassady is not an expert in deception and could have 
been tricked by Mr. Miller’s faking of mental illness.  
 
10. Dr. Cassady has many years of experience detecting people 
who attempt to “fake” mental illness. 
 
11. Dr. Cassady did not interview Mr. Miller until two full 
weeks after the crime occurred, time for the defendant to 
research the symptoms of schizophrenia, or research the 
insanity defense, enough time to learn how to “fake” it. 
 
12. Capgras Delusions are rare and not well known to most 
people, and thus is not a type of mental illness that a person 
could fake easily. 
 
13. The defendant had never been hospitalized for mental 
illness before this crime. 
 
 
14. Even though Mr. Miller had not previously spent time in a 
mental health facility, he was of the age when 
schizophrenia typically first begins and this this could have 
been his first episode of psychosis. 
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MANIPULATION CHECK AND ATTENTION QUESTIONS 
 
 
The verdict options available to me in this case were (select all that apply): 
____ Guilty      _____  Not Guilty      _____  Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity (NGRI)           
______ Guilty but Mentally Ill (GBMI)          ______  Guilty Except Insane (GEI) 
I was provided with detailed information about what would happen to the defendant if I 
found him insane, such as visual aids showing what would happen to him after the trial 
before being released back into the community. 
_____ Yes           ______ No  
I am paying attention.  As such, I am marking the second option below. 
____  A. He said it.    _____ B. I was told to pick this.  
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COMPREHENSION QUESTIONS 
 
What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Not Guilty? 
____ A. He will be immediately released back into the community.  
_____B.  He will go to prison to serve his sentence.  
____ C. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
____ D. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
____ E. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of 
his sentence.  If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is released 
back into the community.  
What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Guilty? 
____ A. He will be immediately released back into the community.  
_____B.  He will go to prison to serve his sentence.  
____ C. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
____ D. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
____ E. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of 
his sentence.  If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is released 
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What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Not Guilty by Reason of 
Insanity (NGRI)? 
____ A. He will be immediately released back into the community.  
_____B.  He will go to prison to serve his sentence.  
____ C. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
____ D. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
____ E. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of 
his sentence.  If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is released 
back into the community.  
What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Guilty But Mentally Ill 
(GBMI)? 
____ A. He will be immediately released back into the community.  
_____B.  He will go to prison to serve his sentence.  
____ C. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
____ D. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
____ E. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of 
his sentence.  If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is released 
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What will happen to the defendant after the trial if he is found Guilty Except Insane 
(GEI)? 
____ A. He will be immediately released back into the community.  
_____B.  He will go to prison to serve his sentence.  
____ C. He will go to prison to serve his sentence, where he might receive 
psychiatric treatment, before he is released back into the community. 
____ D. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until he is no 
longer mentally ill or dangerous, then he will be released back into the 
community. 
____ E. He will go to a secure psychiatric hospital for treatment until the end of 
his sentence.  If he is no longer mentally ill but still dangerous, he will be 
transferred to prison to serve the remainder of his sentence before he is released 
back into the community.  
How helpful were the juror instructions from the judge that were given to you?  
                                 1          2          3          4          5           6          7          8          9     
                Not helpful                                                                     Very helpful 
 
How confusing was it to decide between the verdict options available? 
                                     1          2          3          4          5           6          7          8          9     
      Not at all confusing                                                          Very confusing 
 
What information did you use to assist with your verdict decision? (open-ended)?
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INSANITY DEFENSE ATTITUDE SCALE SURVEY 
 
On the following pages, you will find statements that express commonly held opinions 
about the insanity defense. We would like to know how much you agree or disagree with 
each of these statements. To the right of each statement is a rating scale. You may 
interpret the seven points on this scale as follows: 
 
____1_____/_____2____/____3____/____4____/_____5____/_____6____/______7__ 
STRONGLY DISAGREE SLIGHTLY  NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY   AGREE   STRONGLY 
  DISAGREE                       DISAGREE                          AGREE                            AGREE  
 
After reading each statement, please circle the point on the scale that comes closest to 




1. I believe that people should be held responsible for 
their actions no matter what their mental condition. 
 
2. I believe that all human beings know what they are 
doing and have the power to control themselves. 
 
3. The insanity defense threatens public safety by telling 
criminals that they can get away with a crime if they 
come up with a good story about why they did it. 
 
4. I believe that mental illness can impair people’s 
ability to make logical choices and control 
themselves. 
 
5. A defendant’s degree of insanity is irrelevant: if he 
commits the crime, then he should do the time. 
 
6. The insanity defense returns disturbed, dangerous 
people to the streets. 
 
7. Mentally ill defendants who plead insanity have 
failed to exert enough willpower to behave properly 
like the rest of us. So, they should be punished for 






Disagree                  Agree 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 









1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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8. As a last resort, defense attorneys will encourage 
their clients to act strangely and lie through their teeth 
in order to appear “insane.” 
 
9. Perfectly sane killer can get away with their crimes 
by hiring high-priced lawyer and experts who misuse 
the insanity defense. 
 
10. The insanity plea is a loophole in the law that allows 
to many guilty people to escape punishment 
 
11. We should punish people who commit criminal acts, 
regardless of their degree of mental disturbance. 
 
12. It is wrong to punish people who commit crime for 
crazy reasons while gripped by uncontrollable 
hallucinations or delusions.  
 
13. Most defendants who use the insanity defense are 
truly mentally ill, not fakers.  
 
14. Some people with severe mental illness are out of 
touch with reality and do not understand that their act 
are wrong. These people cannot be blamed and do not 
deserve to be punished.  
 
15. Many of the crazy criminals that psychiatrists see fit 
to return to the streets go on to kill again.  
 
16. With slick attorneys and a sad story, any criminal can 
use the insanity defense to finagle his way to 
freedom.  
 
17. It is wrong to punish someone for an act they commit 
because of any uncontrollable illness, whether it be 
epilepsy or mental illness.  
 
18. I believe that we should punish people for a criminal 
act only if he understood the act as evil and then 
freely chose to do it.  
 
19. For the right price, psychiatrists will probably 
manufacture a “mental illness” for any criminal to 
convince the jury that he is insane.  
Disagree                  Agree 
 









1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 
1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
 
 






























1     2     3     4     5     6     7 
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20.  How strongly do you feel about the insanity defense? 
 
Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very strongly 
 
 
21.  How personally important is your opinion on the insanity defense? 
 
Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   Very important 
 
 
22.  How much do you care about the insanity defense?  
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DEMOGRAPHICS 
1. What is your gender?    ___Male ___Female 
 
2. What is your age? ______ 
 
 
3. What do you consider to be your race or ethnicity?      
__  African American __  Hispanic (non-white) __  Pacific Islander  
__  Asian  __  Hispanic (white)   __ White 
   __  Native American   __ Other 
(Specify______________) 
 
4. Have you ever served on jury duty? 
________Yes    or  _______ No  
 
5. Please rate your support for the death penalty.   
                   1          2          3          4          5           6          7          8          9     
               Strongly Opposed                                                    Strongly In Favor 
 
6. [For people who responded “1” or “2” to previous question] Despite your strong 
opposition to the death penalty, would you be able to set aside your beliefs and 
sentence a defendant to death if there were more aggravating circumstances 
(factors supporting death) than mitigating circumstances (factors supporting life)?  
________Yes    or  _______ No  
7. Would you be able to set aside any beliefs you have against the insanity defense 
and decide that a defendant should be found legally insane if the evidence 
supported such a verdict?   
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APPENDIX E 














On 6/8/2017 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:
Type of Review: Initial Study
Title: The Effects of Insanity Verdict Options and 







Documents Reviewed: • Morgan_Participt Info Sheet 3.pdf, Category: 
Consent Form;
• Morgan_RecruitScript 3.pdf, Category: Recruitment 
Materials;
• IRB Protocol , Category: IRB Protocol;
• AHvMiller_Crim Respon Vignette 2.pdf, Category: 
Technical materials/diagrams;
• Measures for Thesis 2.pdf, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions);
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 6/8/2017. 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).
